For the past few years, the Minnesota Department of Corrections, assisted by Sandia National Laboratories, has developed a set of standards for perimeter security at medium, close, and maximum custody correctional facilities in the state. During this process, the threat to perimeter security was examined and concepts about correctional perimeter security were developed. This presentation and paper will review the outcomes ofthis effort, some of the lessons learned, and the concepts developed during this process and in the course of working with architects, engineers and construction firms as the state upgraded perimeter security at some facilities and planned new construction at other facilities.
Maximum security is reserved for offenders with the most violent crimes on the streets and whose behaviors in prison create concerns for the security and well-being ofothers. Offenders' movement within the facility is severely restricted and scheduled. They are housed one to a cell in living units offifty-two men. The maximum facility is horseshoe shaped and the exterior ofthe horseshoe is earth bermed to the level ofthe roof. There is a taut wire system on the interior edge ofthe roof. The double perimeter fence is three hundred yards away and is equipped with razor ribbon and another perimeter detection device.
There are two close security facilities. Inmates still live one to a cell, but there is somewhat more freedom of movement within the prison. One ofthese facilities is over one hundred years old and is surrounded by the longest continuous granite wall in the world.
The other, the Minnesota Correctional Facility-Stillwater (MCF-STW), is an eighty-five year old prison located in the St. Croix Valley twenty miles east ofthe Twin Cities ofMinneapolis and St. Paul. There are one million interior square feet, most of which is encircled by a 22 foot stone and cement wall topped with guard towers. Approximately one thousand three hundred close custody inmates are housed in single cells in living units of two hundred fifty. Cells are stacked four tiers high. Each tier is sixty-four cells long (approximately 520 feet). The largest living units are located in the main building of the institution.
Work and program space are located in separate buildings within the walled structure. Inmates leave the main building and walk a distance ofthree city blocks to reach these program areas. The recreation yard is between the wall and the main building. The north boundary ofthe recreation yard is the wall. (Inmates use the wall for handball, which is probably the institution's most popular recreational activity.) All the work and program areas are within twenty feet ofthe wall and inmates must walk in these areas to complete their assignments.
There are three medium security prisons. Each perimeter is maximum security, but the interior configurations resemble college campuses. Inside, there is a great deal more freedom ofmovement, relatively speaking.
The Minnesota Correctional Facility-Lino Lakes has approximately one thousand medium custody inmates and is located twenty miles north ofthe Twin Cities. There are 1 1 living units, housing between 52 and 232 inmates each. The secure perimeter consists oftwo chain linked fences with several coils of razor ribbon between them. One of the fences has an intruder detection device. All security zones are monitored by camera. There is a residential neighborhood within three hundred yards ofthe west perimeter ofthe facility.
Recreation, program and work areas are ringed by housing units which are approximately two hundred feet from the fence. The area between the fence and the units is offlimits to the inmates.
As offender populations continue to rise, it has become necessary to improve the perimeters ofthese two prisons by increasing lighting, camera coverage, detection and delays to escape. As budgets continue to decrease, it has become necessary to improve security with fewer staff. Thus, our turn to technology. However, to purchase technology, we must navigate the bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy
Before the bureaucracy will consider physical changes to a facility, we are required to conduct a predesign study, which includes simple drawings ofthe project and a cost analysis. This usually amounts to one percent ofthe cost ofthe total project. Agencies must generate fimds for this activity internally.
In Minnesota, changes ofthis magnitude are considered capital improvements. Because ofthe cost of these changes, it is necessary to receive legislative appropriations. Such appropriations must be recommended by the House and Senate bonding committees, approved by each house ofthe legislature and signed into law by the governor.
Once done, a request for proposals is published in the state register. Respondents submit their proposals to an architectural review board, which is charged with equitably distributing the state's construction business. As architects scramble to submit their proposals, they develop partnerships with engineering and security consultants, to whom they can subcontract technical aspects ofthe projects. A short list of architects is developed and oral presentations are scheduled. Corrections project managers are present and are asked for input after all presentations have been made. However, the decision regarding the award of architecture and engineering is made solely by the board based on the perceived adequacy ofthe plans and the somewhat fuzzier concept of fair distribution of the state's business.
Planning begins in earnest with a series ofmeetings between the architects and corrections. To avoid economic inflation, there is considerable incentive to finish planning quickly and begin construction. The legislative appropriation cannot be exceeded and more money will not be paid for inflation as a result oflate completion. However, ifa construction company can complete planning and construction ahead of schedule quickly and save inflationary costs, they still are allowed to bill for the whole bid amount. Therefore, little time is allotted for test bed planning. Indeed, most designs turn out to be theoretical and debugging is conducted after construction, not before.
Then, another request for proposals is published in the state register calling for construction bids. A walk through with potential construction firms is conducted during which the project is explained. Sealed bids are submitted. Typically, the work is awarded to the low bidder. Construction may begin after the firm submits the required proofs of competency and insurance.
Finally, it is no small feat to conduct business on the grounds of a correctional facility. Workers must submit proof ofnegative TB tests and they are searched coming and going. Tools must be accounted for each night. Security must not be breached. Contractors typically inflate their bids of a correctional project by twenty percent to make up for nonproductive time.
4. Developing a Physical Security System (PPS)
The Minnesota Department of Corrections began working with Sandia National Laboratories in 1993 to develop standards for the design and construction of secure perimeters. Concepts which had been refined to protect sensitive nuclear materials were turned inside out. After all, the target (freedom) for an escapee is outside the secure perimeter of a prison, not inside the secure perimeter as would be the case in a nuclear installation.
The first step in the development ofa PSS design is to determine the objectives ofthe security system. To formulate these objectives, the designer must:
characterize (understand) the facility operations and conditions, 2. define the threat, and 3. identify escape scenarios and other potential adversary targets.
Characterization of facility operations and conditions requires developing a thorough description ofthe facility itself which should include the location ofthe site boundary, building locations. building interior floor plans, and access points. A description ofthe procedures within the facility is also required. as well as identification ofany existing physical security features. This information can be obtained from several sources, including staff interviews, facility design blueprints, departmental procedures, security post orders, and maintenance records.
Next, a threat definition for the facility must be made. Information must be collected to answer three questions about the adversary:
1. What class of adversary is to be considered? 2. What is the range ofthe adversary's tactics? 3 . What are the adversary's capabilities?
In prisons, adversaries can be separated into four classes: inmates, insiders, outsiders, and outsiders in collusion with inmates or insiders. For each class ofadversary, the fill range oftactics--deceit, force, stealth, or any combination ofthese--should be considered. Deceit is the attempted defeat ofa security system by using false authorization and identification; force is the overt, forcible attempt to overcome a security system, and stealth is the attempt to defeat the detection system and exit the facility covertly.
Important capabilities for the adversary include his knowledge ofthe PSS, his level ofmotivation, any skills that would be useful in an escape attempt, the speed with which the escape attempt is carried out, and his ability to obtain and carry tools and weapons. Since it is not generally possible to test and evaluate all possible capabilities of an unknown adversary, the designer and analyst must make assumptions. These assumptions can be based on published information about human performance and the tested vulnerabiities ofphysical security elements.
Finally, target identification should be performed for the facility. All credible escape scenarios should be considered, including the defeat or by-passing of security system components or barriers, breaching of structural features or use offacility features as climbing or bridging aids, use of force or stealth, or the defeat of procedures by deceitful means such as forged gate passes. The credibility of escape scenarios usually depends on identification ofkey features or vulnerabilities in the security system. These targets should become the focal points of the physical security system design.
As potential escape routes and tactical assets are identified, decisions must be made about the extent of vulnerability to escape that they represent. The natural focus of security system design is to harden those features or areas that are most obvious and likely to be used in an escape attempt. Each improvement moves the attention of the potential adversary to the next easier path ofopportunity. The cost ofeach proposed improvement can be measured against the reduction in vulnerability to determine its worthiness for consideration. As the level of vulnerability decreases, we eventually reach the point of "acceptable risk" below which we are willing to accept the vulnerability because additional security is not worth the cost.
There are several functions that the physical security system must perform. It is essential to consider the system functions in detail, since a thorough understanding ofthe definitions ofthese functions and the measure of effectiveness of each is required to evaluate the system. The primary PSS functions are detection, delay and response.
Detection is the discovery of an adversary action. It includes sensing of covert or overt actions and requires that the following things must happen:
. A sensor, which could be a device or person, reacts to an abnormal occurrence and initiates an alarm. . The information from the sensor and assessment subsystems is reported and displayed. . A person assesses information andjudges the alarm to be valid or invalid.
-Ifassessed to be a nuisance alarm, a detection has not occurred.
-Detection without assessment is not considered detection.
The measures of effectiveness for the detection function are the probability of sensing adversary action and the time required for reporting and assessing the alarm. Probability and time may be related as shown in Figure 1 . A sensor activates at time T0. Then at a later time such as T1, T2, or T3, a person receives information from the sensor and assessment subsystems. Ifthe time delay between when the sensor activates and when the alarm is assessed is short (T1) the probability ofdetection, PD, will be close to the probability that the sensor will sense the unauthorized action, Ps. The probability ofdetection decreases as the time before assessment increases. Detection can also be accomplished by corrections officers (CO's) or other personnel. CO's at fixed posts or on patrol may serve a vital role in sensing a prohibited action. Other staff personnel may contribute to detection by being vigilant during performance of their normal duties.
An effective assessment system provides two types of information associated with detection:
• Information about whether the alarm is a valid alarm or a nuisance alarm.
• Details about the cause of the alarm-what, who, where, and how many. Delay is the slowing down of adversary progress. Delay can be accomplished by barriers, locks, and activated delays. The COs can be considered elements ofdelay ifthey are in fixed and well-protected positions from which they can execute use of force consistent with local statutory and facility policy. The measure of delay effectiveness is the time required by the adversary (after detection) to bypass each delay element. Other than deterrence and general population control, any delay encountered by the adversary prior to detection is of no value to the effectiveness ofthe physical security system since a security force cannot respond to an escape attempt that it does not know is occurring. Furthermore, it does not provide additional time to respond to the adversary. Bamers and other forms of delay that are placed before the first alarm point only serve to direct adversary actions away from certain sequences or paths.
The response function typically consists of the actions taken by COs to prevent adversary success, usually the successful interruption of an escape attempt. The measure of response effectiveness is the time between receipt of a communication ofadversary action and the neutralization ofthe adversary action.
The PSS must perform the functions ofdetection, delay, and response. These functions must be performed in a period oftime that is less than the time required for the adversary to complete his tasks. Figure 2 shows the relationships between adversary task time and the time required for the physical security system to do its job. The total time required for the adversary to accomplish his goal has been labeled Adversary Task Time. It is dependent upon the delay provided by the physical security system. The adversary may begin his task at some time before the first alarm occurs, labeled T0 in Figure 2 . The adversary task time is shown by a dotted line before this point because credit cannot be taken for delay before detection -the clock starts when the alarm comes in. After alarm annunciation, the alarm information must be reported and assessed to determine ifthe alarm is valid. The time at which the alarm is assessed to be valid is labeled TA, and at this time the location ofthe alarm must be communicated to the members ofthe response force. Further time is then required for the response force to respond in adequate numbers and with adequate equipment to interrupt and neutralize the adversary actions.
The time at which the response force interrupts adversary actions is labeled T1, and adversary task completion time is labeled T. Clearly, in order for the physical security system to accomplish its objective, T1 must occur before T. It is equally clear that detection (the first alarn) should occur as early as possible and T0 (as well as TA and T1) should be as far to the left on the time axis as possible.
The perimeter of a corrections facility forms the interface between the controlled institutional environment and the outside world that expects to be protected from the convicted criminals confined by a lawful jurisdiction. The primary (but not the only) design objective of the perimeter security system is to prevent inmates from crossing this boundary undetected into the outside world and to allow time for the response force to apprehend the fleeing inmates.
Outcomes
The perimeter security system is a collection ofcomponents or elements that, when assembled in a carefully formulated plan, achieve the objective ofconflnement to a high degree ofconfldence. Keeping in mind that confinement is the ultimate objective, it is clear that anyone attempting to escape the institution by crossing the perimeter must be interdicted by responding officers before the perimeter is successfully penetrated. The perimeter system must ensure that this confrontation can occur. Figure 3 (not drawn to scale) shows a cross section cut through a basic two-fence security perimeter. It illustrates the components of a perimeter system and their relationship to each other. The perimeter itself is delineated by two chain-link fences with an isolation zone between them. All ofthe other components shown, including the camera towers and lighting, make up the security system applied to the perimeter which must incorporate the flmctions of detection, assessment, and delay, all facilitating an armed response to the point at which an escape is being attempted. The detection function is depicted by the dot as a fence disturbance sensor, such as an FPS-2, B-Flex, Guard Wire, Inertia Guard, Intrepid, or Intelliflex, attached to the inner fence. The sensor is placed to detect either cutting or climbing ofthe inner fence. An alarm from this sensor must be communicated back to a central reporting point at which the event is enunciated and its location reported to the corrections officer on monitor duty. A fence disturbance sensor was chosen as the primary means ofdetection for this type ofperimeter due to nuisance alarm and vulnerability considerations, in coordination with the use ofa CCTV assessment system. Assessment and validation ofthe alarm condition is the next essential step. In the figure, this is accomplished by video assessment cameras placed inside the inner fence, positioned to assess alarms generated by sources approaching the fence from that side. They are set back from the fence to view the sensor zone obliquely arid far enough back from the start ofthe sensor zone so that the entire zone can be viewed on screen.
Fenced Perimeter
The lens focal length should be chosen and the camera aimed so that the assessment zone of interest fills that major portion of the video monitor screen. This will provide the best resolution possible for assessment of the source of the alarm. The depth offield ofthe lens must be considered in focusing on the assessment scene. Under the lighting conditions that fully open the lens aperture, the camera should be focused so that as much as possible ofthe sensor zone is in focus, particularly at the farther end ofthe zone. At the farther end ofthe zone, objects of interest in the assessment process will appear to be the smallest. and so must be in better focus for validation purposes than at the near end ofthe zone where the objects are much larger. The design objective ofthe video assessment system is to be able to discriminate between person-sized alarm sources that could be escaping inmates and small animals or other sources ofnuisance alarms.
Since video alarm assessment must be done at all times ofthe day or night. adequate lighting ofthe sensor zone is required at night. Adequacy is determined both by minimum available light level and light-to-dark ratio over the whole scene. For most practical purposes, the minimum light level at the sensor should be about 1 foot-candle and the light-to-dark ratio should not exceed 6 to 1 (the brightest portions ofthe scene should read no more than 6 times brighter than the darkest portions), while a ratio ofless than 4 to 1 is strongly suggested for exterior lighting. This includes the entire area observed by the camera and not just the area of interest. That is, lighting must extend beyond corners and fences to provide even illumination over three-fourths ofthe camera field ofview. The area of primary interest should be uniformly light-colored with a minimum reflectance of3O% when dry. Lighting fixtures should be chosen to deliver adequate light levels when placed at sufficient height to give reasonably even distribution. The spacing ofthe light standards will then be determined by the light-to-dark ratio. Light standards must be set back from the inner fence far enough to assure that the inner fence is evenly illuminated from top to bottom.
The camera towers should be high enough to place the cameras such that they look down on the assessment scene so that the lighted horizon never appears in the field ofview, but below the light fixtures so that the light fixtures are never included in the assessment scene.
The outer fence in the figure is shown with a barrier delay system installed on it. In this case, a series of razorribbon coils are firmly attached to the inner vertical surface and on the top ofthe fence. The coils on the fabric portion ofthe fence are placed to prevent access to the fence for purposes ofeither cutting or climbing. The lower coil is sized, placed, and attached to prevent access to the bottom ofthe fence for tunneling under it or prying it up from the ground. The spacing ofthe coils is such that it limits access to the fence fabric and precludes climbing between them. The coil on the top ofthe outer fence is positioned to impede climbing over the fence. The barrier system must provide enough delay so that the response force will have time to move into position to intercept the escapee before he can penetrate or clear the fence.
The isolation zone between the inner and outer fence must be wide enough to prevent bridging ofthe sensor and barrier system by any practical means. It must also be wide enough to permit convenient cleaning and maintenance ofthe zone. The isolation zone serves the purpose ofpreventing undetected access to the outer barrier system. It also forms a linear confinement zone in which the escapee is trapped after triggering an alarm and while the response force is en route. This limits the area that the response force must cover when they get into position.
The perimeter system presented above represents the basic perimeter security system that meets the operational security requirements ofMaximum, Close, and Medium Security Level facilities.
At Minnesota Correctional Facility-Lino Lakes. a modified version ofthese standards was adopted. It is significant that there is a residential neighborhood within three hundred yards ofthe facility. Even though the prison predates the housing development, the development predates renovation ofthe perimeter and the effect ofsecurity upgrades on the neighborhood had to be considered.
The existing lighting was inadequate for the addition ofcameras. Any increase in visible lighting would disrupt the neighborhood. Visible lighting which activated upon receipt ofalarms would potentially panic the neighbors. Therefore, infrared spotlights which activate upon receipt of alarms were placed on standards between the perimeter fences. Existing visible lighting was upgraded to low pressure sodium. Thus, all standards for lighting and neighborhood considerations were met.
To save the cost of duplicate standards, cameras capable of detecting light across infrared and visible light spectrums were mounted on the same poles next to the infrared spotlights.
Corroded fence fabric was replaced and several coils of razor ribbon were distributed between the fences.
WaIled Perimeter
A perimeter security system that includes a high stone or concrete wall would be more typical ofa security upgrade ofan existing prison with a perimeter wall than ofnew construction. There are two basic design approaches applicable to this situation. In one approach, the wall could be viewed as analogous to the outer fence ofthe system shown in Figure 3 . Sensors, video cameras and lighting could then be added to the configuration in much the same way as discussed above for the fenced perimeter.
A second approach would be to take advantage ofthe height ofthe wall, typically about twenty feet, and install sensors and additional delay bamer on the wall. In an existing facility with a long operating history, it is very likely that the entire yard enclosed within the wall is being utilized for inmate activity. It is understandable that there would be reluctance to relinquish the use ofyard space to allow establishment ofan isolation zone inside the wall. For these reasons, and to take full advantage ofexisting walls, the second approach will be discussed here.
The generally accepted means ofdefeating a high wall is the use ofa ladder or a grappling hook and rope. The same defeat mechanisms apply to buildings that form a part ofthe perimeter. A physical security system installed on a wall or building must therefore counter this threat. The system shown in Figure 4 is based on a twenty-foot high wall with a thickness at the top ofsixteen to twenty four inches. The construction is assumed to be solid stone masonry or reinforced concrete which should discourage attempts to cut through the wall. Lighting standards are also shown mounted on the top ofthe wall since this was typically done in the walled facilities.
Walled Perimeter
The detection system shown in Figure 4 is a multiple-wire capacitive array type of sensor which is typically used either free-standing or mounted to a chain link fence. In this application, the array would be mounted on the wall about fifteen feet above the ground. The array should extend inward five or six feet from the wall, but at least as far as the arm ofthe light standard extends. The sensor is placed to detect a climber approaching the top ofthe wall, and extends inward far enough to detect a ladder or other climbing aid being leaned against the wall or a grappling hook and rope thrown over the wall or the light standard, all ofthese threats coming from the inside. The same sensor would detect adversaries scaling the wall from the outside since there would be no convenient way to get over the wall and inside the yard without encountering the sensor array. The type of sensor array suggested in this figure is made up ofvery thin wires spaced several inches apart. It is not nearly as sensitive to birds landing on these wires as one might expect because the birds are not electrically grounded. The wires must be displaced significantly to vary the electrical capacitance ofthe array enough to trigger an alarm.
The assessment system shown is composed offixed focal length video cameras located inside the wall and positioned essentially as those used for the fenced perimeter. in this case, however, the zone of essential assessment interest may be considered as limited to the sensored area near the top ofthe wall. However, as in the discussion above for the fenced perimeter, the camera towers must be tall enough to prevent the cameras from seeing above the horizon, and they must be aimed to keep the lighting fixtures out ofthe assessment scene. In most cases, these conditions will result in most of the wall and some of the ground leading up to the wall being covered by the field of view. This will allow observation of the source of ropes or climbing aids that may have triggered the alarm. Adequate lighting ofthe assessment scene in this configuration presents more ofa design challenge than the fenced perimeter. Ifthe lighting fixtures are located on top ofthe wall, they will be from ten to fifteen feet from the sensor array in the vertical direction, and five or six feet inboard ofthe wall. This will produce hot spots in the lighted field of view that will exceed acceptable light-to-dark ratios. A solution to this problem would be to add more light sources along the wall, and reduce their intensity or direct them away from the surface ofthe wall.
The barrier delay system shown consists ofthree coils of razor tape deployed above the sensor, along the inner face ofthe wall and along its top. There is essentially no distance between the sensor and the top ofthe wall. A determined adversary may therefore be willing to concede detection based on his ability to clear the wall before the response force can arrive. The razor tape barrier is placed to preclude any access to the top ofthe wall and thus to prevent climbing over the top. The lighting standards could be used to bypass the bamer. They should therefore be designed or modified to break away when heavily loaded.
In this vertically oriented configuration, there is no isolation zone in the sense discussed for the fenced perimeter. The vertical face ofthe wall serves many ofthe same tactical purposes as the isolation zone. The advantage of the vertical arrangement, with the sensors and bamers at the top ofthe wall, is that any attack on the system must be carried out at a deterring height above the ground. There is no way of casually engaging either the sensor or the barrier.
The walled perimeter system presented above represents the basic perimeter security system that meets the operational security requirements ofolder Maximum, Close, and Medium Security Level facilities.
The work of Sandia National Laboratories and cost estimates obtained by staff at Minnesota Correctional FacilityStiliwater ftdfill the requirements ofthe predesign study requirement. However. the facility has not been successful in the political arena, because this project was weak competition in comparison to nearly one hundred million dollars ofhigher prioritized corrections projects, including a $89 million, 800 man close security prison.
Lessons
The most important lesson learned can be summarized in the word 'partnerships.' During negotiations with the architects and security consultants, Minnesota Department of Corrections was able to use the unique capabilities of Sandia National Laboratories to better determine their own needs, prevent mistakes, arrive at solutions to problems, and help to refine construction plans. At the same time, Sandia Was able to leverage security-related lessons learned back into their role as the Department of Energy's Lead Laboratory in Physical Security, which involves knowledge and experience in high security systems engineering, as well as associated research and development, test and evaluation, modeling and simulation, training, and standards activities. Hopefully, future partnerships involving Minnesota Department of Corrections, Sandia National Laboratories. architects, security consultant firms, and others such as the National Institute of Justice, the American Corrections Association, and other corrections agencies can further the development of such teamwork and provide more cost effective security at correctional facilities nationwide.
In addition, as design of the new 800 bed facility progresses in Minnesota, we hope to set up test grounds on the prison site which will yield scientific data upon which to base system decisions.
